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ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether diferent strategies are associated with different sized firms in a
focal industry dominated by small family-owned businesses. In an effori to shed light on how
strategic clioice is determined, a well-defined and geographically concentrated industry, i.e.,
the Northern Cal%rnia wine industry, is selected to minimize environmental noise. Factor
analysis is applied to fourteen strategic elements to extract a parsimonious set offive primary
competitive strategies: new product/market development, consolidation, niche focus,
proprietary processes, and flexibility. The factors, new productlmarket development and
consolidation as well as the control variable, age, are found to be signijicantly associated
with firm size.
INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurship theory suggests that a preoccupation with growth distinguishes
entrepreneurial firms from other small firms (Baumol, 1967; Carland, Hoy, Boulton, bt
Carland, 1984; Dollinger, 1999; Penrose, 1959). Differences in size can be explained by a
smaller firm's agility amidst uncontrollable external forces, e,gz social/demographic,
economic, political/regulatory, industry/competition, and technology (Miller, 1998). Some
mature industries, such as women's hairdressers or agricultural commodity producing
industries, are very homogeneous in terms of marketing efforts, R&D expenses, or capital
intensity (as measured by the ratio of assets to sales). Other industries tend to be very
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heterogeneous with respect to firm size, comprising multiple strategic groups or tiers, such as
accounting, pharmaceuticals, and automobile parts (Miller, 1998).
Mature industries are characterized by slowing growth, diminishing innovation, more product
and process improvements, more sophisticated customers, and increasing concentration of
producers (Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 1992; Porter, 1980). In a mature industry, defensible
growth niches exist for firms that are successful in differentiating a commodity product or
support service. Famous examples of this strategy in consumer products include: Starbucks
Coffee, Perdue Chicken, and Orville Redenbacher Popcorn. These firms succeeded in
"branding" commodity products and achieving leading positions in their respective markets.
They hold differentiated positions, enjoying the higher margins derived from the premium
prices that they charge (Miller, 1998).
Prior researchers in the fields of strategy and entrepreneurship suggest that small firms in a
mature industry pursue growth strategies that result in consolidation of a fragmented industry
and economies of scale (Miles, Snow, & Sharfman, 1993; Porter, 1985, 1996).Others suggest
that growing firms pursue innovation and focus strategies (Maruso & Weinzimmer, 1999;
McGee & Shook, 2000). For small, entrepreneurial firms, when cost-effectiveness and
maintenance of coalitions, particularly among family or founding team members who are still
owners/managers of the firm, are key objectives, other responses to change may emerge
(1)ollinger, 1999). These include: (I) contracting out those services rather than relying on
internal capabilities (Miller, 1998); (2) contracting with special intermediaries (Birley, 1985);
or (3) relying on networks such as trade associations to suggest tried and tested
implementations of industry best practices (Falemo, 1989). The latter alternative may be
desirable if change occurs infrequently and firm and industry perspectives on the issues
involved tend to converge (Aldrich, 1979).
This paper seeks to address a gap in previous small firm research regarding how size is
associated with strategic choice. The research question for this study is: to what extent is there
an association between size and the strategy followed, i.e., do larger firms adopt different
strategies than smaller ones in a mature industry? The next section examines prior
perspectives regarding strategy and firm size. Procedures for constructing a sample and survey
instrument are developed. Results from analysis of the association between size and strategy
are presented. Implications for researchers of small firms and practitioners are given,
culminating in suggestions for future research.
STRATEGY AND FIRM SIZE
Successful small firms "must seek a balance between the ends to which the organization
aspires and the ways and means available to them" (Steiner & Solem, 1988). Prior researchers
have suggested that there is no all-encompassing theoretical framework capable of explaining
and guiding the strategic management of small firms, although several researchers have
attempted to form such a theory (Churchill & Lewis, 1989; Flamholtz, 1986; Greiner, 1972;
Scott & Bruce, 1984). Building on the approach developed by d'Amboise and Muldowney
(1988), two strategic perspectives can be drawn from the literature: (I) specialization in the
firm's task environment and (2) new product/market development to overcome barriers to
growth. Taken together, these perspectives provide a useful taxonomy for organizing the
competitive strategies of the small firm.
Specialization in the Task Environment
The task environment refers to those key factors that directly affect and are affected by a
firm's competitive strategies. Among these factors are competitors, suppliers, stockholders,
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local communities, governments, labor unions, special interest groups, and employees
(Wheelen & Hunger, 1986). Scott and Bruce (1987) identified the entry of larger competitors
as an important barrier to growth as the small firm attempts to grow. Yet, because of its
narrower scope or specialization, a small firm can develop a competitive advantage using its
flexibility to provide products and services or to perform activities better than its larger, more
broadly-based competitors (Lau, 1996; Porter, 1985). Sources of advantage could include: (I)
serving a market niche and defending that market segment (Clifford & Cavanagh, 1985;
Porter, 1980; Taylor, Gilinsky, Hilmi, Hahn, & Grab, 1990); (2) following a path of least
resistance relative to the industry's competitive forces (Miller, 1988; Porter, 1980); (3)
leveraging a distinctive competence, i.e., a special skill or unique product that could be
protected by a trade secret, brand name or copyright (Barney, 1991;Hamel & Prahalad, 1993;
Porter, 1980); (4) investing and applying new technology to develop proprietary processes
(Churchill & Lewis, 1989). Specialization of production or innovation in operations would
develop a capability to support and defend the market niche. Staking out a niche or focus
position, e.g. via serving a well-defined customer group and investing in new technology,
should be negatively related to firm size. Pursuing a broad-based strategy, i.e. developing a
wide range of commodity-type products, should be positively related to firm size.
New Product/Market Development
A small firm could pursue a new product/market development strategy involving the
following elements: (I) diversifying into new products (Porter, 1980); (2) entering early into
new markets or product/service applications (Biggadike, 1979); (3) expanding overseas
(Brush, 1996; Lohrke, Franklin, & Kothari, 1999);or (4) diversifying via acquisition (Maruso
& Weinzimmer, 1999). Inability to pursue at least one of the above strategic elements poses a
barrier to growth. If small firms stake out positions or niches that make them less vulnerable
to attack from competitors, then the niche may become a restriction on further growth.
Lumpkin and Dess (1995: 1404) argue that, "excessive simplicity in the later stages of
development affects an organization's ability to exploit existing or new product-market
opportunities more than its ability to efficiently allocate and utilize resources." Pressures
towards increasing complexity would indicate that new product/market development, e.g. via
creating new product concepts or innovation in processes, should be positively related to firm
size. Retrenchment, e.g. via decreasing the number of markets served or consolidation, should
be negatively related to firm size.
METHODOLOGY
Sample
One means of examining the testing the real world strategy making processes of small
businesses would be to ask them directly. In this regard we selected a focal industry that was
regional and identifiable (to hopefully minimize environmental noise in the investigation) and
sought to identify and evaluate sources of competitive advantages as noted by small business
owners. The industry selected was the Northern California wine industry, concentrated in
Napa and Sonoma counties. The Northern California wine industry is coping with an
environment characterized by high growth in premium price segments, offset by declining
domestic consumption of wine and industry consolidation in low-end price segments (Shapiro
1998; Tesconi 1998). In 1999,over 900 small California wineries produced 149 million cases
of wine, accounting for 85% of the total U.S. wine market (Wine Business Monthly, 1999).
Offsetting declining per capita consumption in the U.S. and flat export sales, Northern
California premium wine sales and production have grown over 20% per year, leading to the
entry of new wineries into the market and to the expansion of existing wineries. However,
nearly all of this growth occurred in high-end market segments, while the lower-priced
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segments experienced accelerating maturity and consolidation. This situation has raised the
importance of exports, foreign subsidiaries, strategic alliances, all in the face of increasing
competition from other "New World" wine producers (namely Australia, Chile, and South
Africa, not to mention wineries in 49 other states).
Predominantly family-owned, wine businesses provide the backbone for job creation and
growth in Northern California's agricultural economy, yet relatively little is known about
them. There is sparse rigorous research that captures the strategic issues faced by this
important industry. Prior empirical research into the behavior of firms in this industry has
focused on documenting the frequency of organizational entry and exit (Delacroix &
Swaminathan, 1991; Stoeberl, Parker, &, loo, 1998), the creation of inter-organizational
networks (Brown & Butler, 1995) and the evolution of specialist organizations (Swaminathan,
1995).Studies specifically addressing wine industry strategic management are needed (Brown
& Butler, 1995; Hartley, 1997).
Data
An initial database of 568 wineries in Northern California (primarily Napa, Sonoma, and
Mendocino counties) was built from IVines Ck Vines (1999) and IVine Business Montltly's
IVine Industry Directory and tllmanac (1996) and verified hy a panel of experts from the wine
industry. The initial database of 568 firms was then scrubbed to eliminate duplications (i.e.,of
firms owned by another winery or part of a consortium), or for no longer participating in the
industry; at this point 200 firms were eliminated for a universe of 368 firms. A pilot version of
the questionnaire was sent to 12 owners and/or CEOs of wineries and wine-support
businesses, equally divided among small, medium and large wineries and between Napa and
Sonoma counties, dominant in the Northern California wine industry. Results of the pilot test
indicated that the questionnaire was too lengthy and a section asking respondents for
anecdotal information was cut from the final version. The resulting questionnaire booklet sent
to the owners/CEOs of the remaining 356 wineries consisted entirely of LikeN-scale
questions. Respondents were asked to describe their business and to rate the importance of
fourteen competitive strategies that they were currently using.
Survey Response
The historically private nature of the wine industry (only six firms in the sample were public
firms, representing the entire universe of public firms in the industry) posed a major obstacle
to gathering data about competitive strategy. In an attempt to increase response rates, we
adhered to the Dillman (1991)mail survey methodology. Initial response was 59 firms with
completed surveys; four responded by a letter of inability to participate rather than a
completed survey; and 34 surveys were returned partially completed and discarded. On a
second mailing, postcards were sent to remind the remaining 263 firms that they had been sent
the survey and to ask again if they would participate, and 12 completed surveys were returned.
AAer a third reminder mailing, 12 more completed surveys were received. No statistically
significant differences were found between surveys completed by early respondents and later
respondents. We received 118 surveys: 83 complete and 34 incomplete and one
unidentifiable, for a total response rate of 32.0'lo. Al)er elimination of incomplete or
unidentifiable surveys, the response rate was 83 out of 368 or 22,6uo. Questionnaire length
was deemed to be the major cause of non-response. Neither size nor ownership (public vs.
private) appeared to cause significant differences in response rates of sample firms.
Consistent with the fact that firms in the Northern California wine industry are predominately
privately-held (Tesconi, 1998), our sample of 83 firms consisted of 77 firms that were sole
proprietorships or partnerships and seven firms that were publicly-owned. Consistent with
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industry segment sizes reported in Wines ttl Vines, over half of the respondent wineries in the
sample sold one brand only (57%), reflecting the small size of the preponderance of
respondents. Twenty-one percent sold two or three brands, 16% four or more brands, and four
percent no branded products, presumably subcontracting to larger wineries.
Data on production output for 1999 and age of the winery (based on self-reporting) for 67
wineries in the sample were available from Wine Today's web site. Data on the remaining 16
wineries were unavailable. Production output was considered more reliable a measure of firm
size than was sales for two reasons. First, we caught these firms during a period of rapidly
rising wholesale and retail demand for premium wines, causing upward pressure on prices.
Second, because of the nature of the wine product itself, firms could generally charge and
receive higher prices for older inventory (as unit and case wine prices typically rise with bottle
age).
RESULTS
Table I provides descriptive statistics about the 67 wineries that have production data. Panel
A indicates that the majority of the wineries are private (94%), are organized by function
(68%), distribute and sell only one brand (56%), are estate wineries (54%) and produce wine
at their own facilities (71%). Panel B of table 1 shows that most of the wineries compete in
the deluxe and over $25 price categories, 38% and 23%, respectively. On average, the
wineries sell 53% of their product in the U.S. (excluding California), 38% in California and
7% internationally. On average, the most popular method of distribution is brokerslagents
(29%), followed by sales force (23%), external sales and marketing company (23%).
Customer Segments
We divided the sample with production data into two approximately equal sized groups as a
starting point in our investigation of the relation between size and strategy. Thirty-three
wineries produced output greater than 20,000 cases and were labeled "high volume" and 34
wineries produced 20,000 or fewer cases and were labeled "low volume." All of the low
volume and all but four of the high volume wineries are privately owned. We examined the
high and low volume groups to determine what, if any differences there are in competitive
strategies deployed.
Competitive Strategies
Table 2 lists the mean and median importance scores of competitive strategies divided for
high and low volume wineries. For the high volume wineries the most important competitive
strategies were: rapidly responding to customers'eeds, attracting and hiring high quality
statT, investing in new technology and serving a well defined customer group.
Several strategies were significantly more important to high volume than to low volume
wineries. These strategies included: rapidly investing in new technology, rapidly responding
to customer needs, developing exclusive processes, acquiring other companies, and selling to
customers in new overseas markets, for the low volume wineries the most important factors
were: serving a well-defined customer group and attracting and holding high quality stalT.
"Serving a local market or markets" was significantly more important to low volume than to
high volume wineries as a competitive strategy.
We continue to investigate the relation between size and strategy by evaluating the association
between changes in strategies used and changes in size using a linear regression. We perform
a regression so that we can assess which strategies are significant in explaining size. Because
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we have a limited data set including all the strategies in a linear regression would reduce the
degrees of freedom in the regression and our ability to assess the incremental contributions of
individual strategies on size. We address this data limitation by performing a factor analysis
on the strategies (o sec if we could summarize 14 the strategies into fewer strategic factors.
Finding a morc parsimonious representation of the factors would allow us to increase the
power of regression tests.
Table I: Descriptive Statistics
(n = 67)
PANEL A
Number of Percentage ofAttribute of Business Wineries Wineries
Ownership
Pubic 4 6 .0%
Private 63 94.0
Organized by
Function 45 68.2%
Product 13 19.7
Region 2 3.0
Not specified 6 9.1
Number ofseparute brunds distributed and sold
I brand 37 56.1%
2-3 brand 16 24.2
4+ brands 10 15.2
No Branded Products I 1.5
Did not specify 2 3.0
Nature ofbusiness
Bulk producer 2 3.0%
Custom crush facility 2 3.0
Grower 2 3.0
Estate winery 36 53.7
Negotiant 2 3.0
Winery 21 31.8
Other I 1.5
Where wine produced
Own facility 47 71.2%
Both types of facilities 9 13.6
Custom crush facility
(exclusively)
Other 0 0.0
Did not specify I 1.5
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Panel B
Percentage Min. I"Quartile Mean Median 3 Quartile Max.u Al
of Respondents
Price Categories Wines Compete Jn
Economy (& $3) 0 00% 0 00% 0 00% 0.00% 0 00% 0%
Sub- Premium ($3 - 7) 0.00 0.00 2.20 0.00 0.00 60
Premium ($7 - 10) 0.00 0.00 8.45 0.00 0.00 90
Ultra- Premium ($10- 14) 0.00 0.00 11.52 0.00 15.00 80
Deluxe ($ 14- 25) 0.00 0.25 38.29 25.00 75.75 100
$25 - 50 0.00 0.00 23.23 7.50 31.00 100
$ &50 0.00 0.00 6.65 0.00 1.00 100
Geographic Sales
California 0.00% 25.00% 38.25% 35.00% 50.00% 100%
National 0.00 41.25 53.31 57.50 69.50 95
International 0.00 1.00 6.61 5.00 10.00 75
rlge (years) 5.00 14.50 28.51 20.00 25.00 144
Sales and Distribution of Products
Brokers/Agon'ts 0.00% 0.00% 28.50% 15.50% 50.00% 100%
Sales Force 0.00 0.00 22.79 0.00 36.50 100
Own retail outlets, tasting
p pp p 25 11 98 10 pp 15 pp 9
rooms(s)
Sales gc Marketing Compariy 0 00 0.00 22.56 0.00 60.00 95(external)
Direct mail, telemarketing,
wine club
Outside Services (Internet 0.00
stores, other wine clubs)
Other 0.00 0.00 3.14 0.00 0.00 77
Table 3 presents the results of factor analysis on the competitive strategies for the entire
sample (n= 83). We used the varimax orthogonal rotation to estimate the factor loadings so
that the factors would be easier to interpret. Because we have strategy data for 83 firms we
included all firms in the factor analysis'. Each of the estimated factors is labeled according to
the competitive construct that we interpreted the factor to represent. The first factor was
labeled "NEW PRODUCT/MARKETS," because it loaded heavily on selling of new ranges
of products, creating new product concepts, investing in new technology and entering early
into growth markets. The second factor was called "CONSOLIDATION," because it loaded
heavily on decreasing the number of markets served and adjusting sales goals and profit goals
The factor analysis and regression results using the production data sample (n=67) do not
differ materially from the results presented.
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downward. The third factor loaded most heavily on serving a well-defined customer group
and investing in new technology and captured the notion of a "NICHE" strategy. The fourth
factor was labeled "PROPRIETARY," because it loaded heavily only on "developing
exclusive processes." The fifth factor was labeled "FLEXIBILITY,"because it loaded heavily
only on the strategy of rapidly responding to customer needs. The percent of variance
explained by the five factors is 51%. 'fhe test chi-square statistic, 33.1 with a p-value of 0.36,
demonstrated that above five factors were sufficient to represent the fourteen competitive
strategy variables.
Table 2
Competitive Strategies of the Sample Firms (n=83)
/Scales I = lowest impiirtance, 7 = higliest importance)
High Volume Low Volume()20,000 cases) (&= 20,000 cases) Statistical Tests
Competitive Strategies n=33 n=34
WilcoxonMean Median Mean Median T S .. p-valueest tatistic
kapidly responding to 5.5 6.0 4.3 5.0 2.75 0.01
customer needs
Attracting and holding high 5 5 6 p 5 3 6 p 0.21 0.83
quality staff
investing in ncw technology 5.4 6.0 4.4 5.0 2.5 0.01
Serving a well-dcfincd 5.3 6.0 5.6 6.0 -1.38 0.17
customer group
Selling to customers in new 5.1 6.0 3.9 4.0 2.46 0.01
markets ovcrscas
Creating new produci concepts 4.6 5.0 4.2 5.0 0.77 0.44
Entering carly into growth 4.5 4.0 4.4 4.0 0.17 0.87Inafkcis
Selling new ranges ot'products 4.5 5.0 3.8 4.0 1.28 0.20
Serving a local market or 4.1 4.0 4.8 5.0 -1.67 0.09Ili ark cw
Developing a exclusive 4.1 4.0 3.2 4.0 1.92 0.05proccsscs
Becoming a smaller, morc 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.0 -0.62 0.53
tlcxible organization
Acquiring other companies 2.7 2.0 1.9 1.0 2.09 0.04
Decreasing thc number of 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.64 0.52
markets scrvcd
Ad)usting sales goals and Profit 2 2 S p 0.36 0.72goals dowmvard
Competitive Strategies and Size
Using the scores for each of the factors, we constructed variables labeled, "NEW
PRODUCT/MARKETS", "CONSOLIDATION", "NICHE", "PROPRIETARY"
"FLEXIBILITY", which were used as independent explanatory variables in a regression
analysis. We included AGE of the winery as an independent variable to control for the etTect
of length of time in business on size. Table 4 reports the estimates from the regression of the
natural logarithm output on the five strategic factors for the 67 of the 83 sample wineries that
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we have production data for. We took the natural logarithm of output so that a few large or
small producers did not drive the results. The factor NEW PRODUCTS/MARKETS and the
control AGE were positively associated with the level of output. The factor
CONSOLIDATION was negative and significantly associated with the level of output.
Together the variation in these independent variables explained 41% of the variation in
Outpun
Table 3
Factor Loading Using Varimax Orthogonal Rotation of Competitive Strategies
Factor 5Factor t
. Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Strategy "New Deduct/ttfarket "Consolidation "/Viche "proprietary
"Flexi hi llty"
, Development" 'Strategy" Strategy" Process".-
Entering early into 0 495 0.317
growth markets
Serving a well-
defined customer 0.632 0.138
grolip
-0.200 0.330 0.324 0.301 0.113
Investing in new 0.522 -0.153 0.496
technology
Creating new 0.660 0.131 0.259product concepts
Becoming n smaller,
more flexible 0.129 0.445 0.304
organization
Rapidly responding 0.283 0.280 0.218 0.889
to customer needs
0.328 0.156 0.916 0.165
exclusive processes
Selling new ranges 0.709 0.124 0.358 0.189
ofproducts
Acquiring other 0.392 -0.175
companies
Decreasing number 0.778 0.127
ofmarkets served
ztdjasting sales
goals ik profit goals 0.680
downward
Selling to customers
in new markets 0.311 -0.235 0.212
overseas
ztnracting ik
holding high quality 0.173 0.606 0.147
staff
14.25 % 10.88% 9.62 % 8.26 % '%u
explained by factor
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Table 4
Regression Analysis of Strategic Factors on Size
Independent Variables C ff
Regression Std.
t-value Pr()[tl)oefficients Error
(Intercept) 9.39 0.22 41.86 0.00
New product/market 0.38
development 0.21 1.74 0.09
Consolidation strategy -0.37 0.19 -1.98 0.05
Niche strategy 0.10 0.20 0.54 0.59
Proprietary process 0.16 0.17 0.95 0.35
Flexibility 0.26 0.16 1.60 0.11
Age 0.02 0.01 4.23 0.00
Residual standard error: l.29 on 60 degrees offreedom
Mu/tip/a R-Squaredt 0.4/
F statistic: 688 on 6 and 60 degrees offreedom, the p-value is 0 00
DISCUSSION
This exploratory research has several implications for the entrepreneur. The most important is
that small firms do not necessarily have to increase the variety of the strategies pursued in
order to become larger. Consistent with prior research on strategic simplicity, there appears to
be a salutory association of two strategies with firm size, namely entry into new
product/markets and flexibility (Lumpkin & Dess, 1995; Miller & Chen, 1996). The maxim
that, "Less is more," applies here. In industries that have several large, well-established
competitors, smaller firms that desire expansion have to evaluate carefully their repertoire of
competitive strategies to develop market learning and innovative techniques. Prior studies
have shown that a minimum output of 50,000 cases per year is considered the minimum to
capture any economies of scale in this industry (Brown & Butler, 1995; Swaminathan, 1995).
Still, it may well be that these entrepreneurs were concentrating more on staying small and
preserving their uniqueness, considered vital for "branding" and differentiating a commodity
product like wine.
Regarding the leadership and strategic profile results, it appears that risk-taking, innovative,
and proactive (entrepreneurial) entry strategies may be instrumental to achieving initial
growth for smaller firms. New entrants in this industry should consider pursuing an
"aggressive" strategy aimed at niche market definition and penetration via "entrepreneurial"
behaviors. Established, growing businesses in this industry tend to experience diminishing
eAicacy of entrepreneurial behavior and during the transition phase, need to pay greater
attention to building management systems and market share. For mature, slower growth firms
in the wine industry, building more "administrative" processes to improve operating
eAiciency and cost competitiveness may lead to increased performance.
While among the sample respondents there are several examples of larger firms that had
successfully pursued innovation, sometimes revolutionizing the industry, this proved to be the
exception rather than the rule. Leaders of wine business eventually best served their interests
by emphasizing the establishment of centralized control, standardized operations, formal rules
and procedures, or other "mechanistic" tools designed to promote internal efliciency in an
uncertain environment.
10
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The changing dynamics of the wine industry in recent years have generated a desperate need
for a comprehensive understanding of wine business best practices. In the words of several
wine business leaders who responded anecdotally to our survey, the following seem to apply
to all wine businesses, regardless of size or situation:
Each management group must look to parallel industries to examine reasons for
success.
Leaders need to develop long-term financial and marketing planning tools
(surprisingly this is not being done).
Stay tuned with cutting-edge technology.
Understand viticulture as a MkeyM component in marketing.
Winery principals that are production oriented need to "learn" how to develop
promotional skills.
The results should be interpreted with caution in terms of their applicability to other mature
industries. Because the study was exploratory in nature, no causal relationships are implied.
Further research should explore the differential impact of competitive strategies on growth
rates. Future research should also be designed to overcome some of the limitations of this
study. The relatively small sample of firms and executives included in the field study may
have led to some instability in the factor loadings obtained. For example, the negative loading
of consolidation was somewhat surprising, in that one would expect that since the industry is
highly fragmented and mature, merger and acquisition or retrenchment activities would have
been more prevalent, particularly among those smaller wineries seeking greater scale
economies while preserving their uniqueness as "brands." Longitudinal research with larger
sample sizes is needed to determine the nature and impact of consolidation strategies on firm
size.
The Northern California wine industry was selected in order to eliminate industry differences
and because it has a growing but identifiable membership, many of who are new
entrepreneurial entrants competing against a few well-established corporate competitors.
Rapid strategic shi(ts are difficult since the wine industry is highly regulated, capital-
intensive, and has long lead times between planting grapes and selling wine. Despite the fact
that very strong rate of growth in premium segments is the result of its current strategic mix,
compared with firms in other wine producing countries, its players exhibit some significant
weaknesses with respect to their longer-term competitive strategies (Orr, 1999).If the industry
could work in concert to help smaller producers to develop strategies to enter new
product/markets, particularly in export markets, it would further secure its position as a world-
competitive manufacturer.
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